„მაგრამ სახლში კი აბსოლუტურად ვერ შემოხვედით“ (მეფისტო), ანუ ფიხტეს სუბიექტური იდეალიზმის რეცეფცია და კრიტიკა გოეთეს „ფაუსტში“

ანოტაცია

In the second act of the second part of Goethe’s Faust, Mephistopheles, disgui­sed as Faust, sarcastically addresses a former student, now a bachelor, with the words: “But don’t go home absolute!” (“kommt nur nicht absolut nach Haus”) [V. 6736] (Go­ethe, 2001, p. 63). The remark clearly alludes to a central concept in Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s philosophy, the “Absolute I” (“das absolute Ich”) (Gaier, 2004, p. 87). It also signals Goethe’s critical stance toward this notion and toward Fichte’s philosophy more broadly. This moment is not the only instance where Fichte’s presence reso­nates in Goethe’s text. Throughout Faust, the critique and reception of Fichtean thought recur persistently. The fact that, in the first part of the tragedy, Faust trans­lates the logos, which occurs in the Greek Gospel of John, as “deed,” “action” (“die Tat”) likewise reflects, in my view, impulses that stem directly from Fichtean philosophy.

 Moreover, when the bachelor, in his discussion with Mephistopheles dis­gui­sed as Faust, brings forward the concepts of action (“da wird was getan”) and creation (“schafft”), this aligns him closely with Fichte’s ideas. At this point it becomes clear that he shares the meaning of Fichte’s concepts of “Tathandlung” (primordial deed) and “Akt” (act): “Man’s life is in his arteries, and when Are they so vibrant as in youn­ger men? There the fresh blood full of strength Creates new life from its own life again („schafft“). There all works, and things get done, The waverers fall, the ca­pable get on. („da wird was getan“) [V. 6774-6784] (Goethe, 2001, p. 64). It is evident that the bachelor is “Fichtean,” and Mephistopheles – disguised as Faust – also percei­ves him as a “Fichte” or “Fichtean,” as becomes clear when he mocks him ambiguous­ly during their exchange: I see you’re bold and resolute (It is noteworthy that this determination, perseverance, and intensity were highly characteristic of Fichte in his own life. K.B.) But don’t go home absolute! („Ganz resolut und wacker seht Ihr aus / Kommt nur nicht absolut nach Haus“) [V. 6735-6736] (Goethe, 2001, p. 63). As I ha­ve noted, it is clear here that with the word “absolutely” (“absolut”) Mephisto is alluding to the central concept of Fichte’s philosophy-the “Absolute I” (“das absolute Ich”) (Gaier, 2004, p. 87). Accordingly, through his ambiguity Mephisto sarcastically points out to the bachelor that he is still far from becoming an Absolute I, that is, far from attaining divine perfection, which would mean fully comprehending the entire world, fully knowing oneself, and then, through one’s own power, recreating a new, perfected world. His remark implies that the bachelor’s striving for wholeness, per­fection, and the Absolute is futile.

Thus, the appearance of the “terms,” phraseology, and formulations of German Idealism in the text of Faust is by no means accidental. For example, Goethe’s con­cepts of “Tat” (deed) and “Tätigkeit” (activity) correspond to Fichte’s notions of “Ta­than­d­lung” (primordial deed) and “Akt” (act), while the ethical and epistemological content of Fichte’s “Handeln” (acting) aligns with Goethe’s notion of striving (“streben”). This is entirely unsurprising, since German Idealism constitutes one of the most powerful currents of modern philosophy, and in Faust – a fundamentally mo­dern text in which the events and impulses of modern history are refracted (Bre­gadze, 2024, pp. 403-496) – it is natural that the critique and reception of German Idealism, as well as its terminology and borrowed formulations, should emerge to varying degrees.